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Abstract 
 
Legal origins theory suggests that law reform, strengthening shareholder and 
creditor rights, should enhance financial development.  We use recently created 
datasets measuring legal change over time in a sample of 25 developing, 
developed and transition countries to test this claim.  We find that increases in 
shareholder protection contribute to stock market growth in the common law 
world and in developing countries, but not in the civil law world.  We also find 
evidence of reverse causation, with financial development triggering legal 
changes in the developing world.  We consider a number of reasons for the 
selective impact of law reform, focusing on the endogeneity of the legal system 
to its economic context, and on resulting complementarities between legal and 
financial institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The view that a strengthening of shareholder and creditor rights is a 
precondition for financial development has been a mainstay of global policy 
initiatives and national law reform programmes since the early 1990s.  
Underpinning this policy has been the ‘legal origins’ hypothesis (see La Porta et 
al., 2008 for a recent restatement).   This claims that legal institutions have a 
long-run impact on the pattern of economic growth.  Countries whose legal 
systems derive from the common law are said to place a greater emphasis on 
freedom of contract and the protection of private property than those with civil 
law roots, which tend to favour an activist role for the state (Glaeser and 
Shleifer, 2002).  The common law/civil law divide is reflected in economic 
outcomes.  Quantitative indicators have been developed to chart the extent of 
cross-national variation in the content of laws governing the business enterprise 
and to establish correlations between legal and economic variables (Djankov et 
al., 2003).  These show that common law systems have a higher degree of 
dispersed share ownership and more liquid and extensive capital markets (La 
Porta et al., 1998), together with more highly developed systems of private 
credit (Djankov et al., 2007a), than civil law ones.  In part through the Doing 
Business reports of the World Bank, these findings have come to influence 
policy reform in ‘dozens of countries’ over the past decade (La Porta et al., 
2008: 326).  Over this period, changes to corporate and insolvency law became 
a core component of the Washington consensus view on the importance of legal 
and institutional reform in promoting economic development (Williamson, 
2000). 
 
Important and influential as it is, the legal origins literature is radically 
incomplete at the theoretical level.  The claim that legal origin is exogenous to 
the long-run pattern of economic development carries with it the implication 
that the nature of a country’s legal infrastructure is fixed at the point when it 
first adopts or has imposed upon it a particular type of legal system.  This is a 
very strong claim.  An alternative hypothesis is that, over time, legal systems 
interact with economic and political structures at national level, and as well as 
influencing them, may be altered by them. National legal orders are also subject 
to external pressures from harmonization and regulatory competition.  These 
aspects of the dynamics of legal change are not currently well captured by legal 
origins theory. 
 
The empirical side of the legal origins literature also suffers from significant 
limitations. The datasets used to substantiate the legal origins hypothesis 
provide mostly cross-sectional evidence on the state of the law as it stood in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s.  It is highly problematic to draw firm conclusions 
2 
 
on the long-run relationship between legal change and economic development 
on the basis of cross-sectional data of this kind, although this is precisely what 
many papers do, including some of the most highly cited in the law and finance 
field (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998). 
 
In this paper we synthesise the results of an emerging body of work, both 
theoretical and empirical, which provides a critique of the legal origins 
approach.  This work draws on newly constructed longitudinal measures of 
cross-national legal variation which make it possible to reassess the relationship 
between legal and economic variables, using time-series and panel-data 
techniques.  Section 2 below discusses legal origins theory and identifies a 
number of core hypotheses to emerge from that body of work and associated 
new-institutional analyses of legal systems.  Section 3 provides an account of 
methodological issues arising from the coding of legal change over time and 
provides evidence from longitudinal datasets concerning the nature and 
direction of legal reforms since the mid-1990s in a range of developed, 
developing and transition countries.  Section 4 presents econometric analysis 
concerning the relationship between legal reforms and economic outcomes in 
the area of financial development in these countries.  In addition to summarising 
some earlier research using longitudinal datasets, we present new findings for a 
sample of 25 countries over the period 1995 to 2005.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Legal Origins Theory: Refining the Core Hypotheses  
 
The theoretical foundation of the interdisciplinary field of law and finance lies 
in new institutional economics, and specifically in the claim that the quality of 
legal and other institutions makes a difference to economic development and 
growth (North, 1990).  Within this general framework, legal origins theory, 
which has been extremely influential among researchers and policy-makers 
since the mid-1990s, has generated two central hypotheses (La Porta et al., 
1998, 2008).  The first of these is that the content of the law affects the nature of 
economic growth: countries with laws that protect contract and property rights, 
and in particular those which seek to foster financial development through 
norms of shareholder and creditor protection, should experience a pattern of 
market-driven, financially-orientated economic growth.  The second version of 
the claim is that countries with a common law origin (that is to say, derived 
ultimately from the English legal system) are more likely to have market-
friendly laws in the sense just described, than those with their origins in one of 
the civil law families (the French, German and Nordic legal systems).   
 
La Porta et al.’s early work focused on the first of these claims.  Their landmark 
‘law and finance’ paper (La Porta et al., 1998) showed that countries whose 
laws gave shareholders extensive rights to hold boards and senior managers to 
3 
 
account, thereby reducing agency costs associated with the separation of 
ownership and control in listed firms, had more dispersed share ownership and a 
higher level of stock market capitalisation relative to GDP than countries with 
weaker laws.  In this early work, La Porta et al. used the common law or civil 
law origin of national laws as an instrumental variable for the purposes of 
demonstrating that the direction of causation ran from the content of the law to 
financial outcomes, rather than  vice versa.  In their more recent work, La Porta 
et al. (2008) have come round to the view that legal origin should be regarded 
as a causal variable in its own right.  They argue that because nearly all 
countries in the world inherited their legal systems by conquest or colonisation 
(the ‘parent’ systems of England, France and Germany are almost the only 
exceptions) prior to industrialisation in the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, legal origin must operate as an exogenous influence on the 
economy (La Porta et al., 2008). 
 
It should be noted that La Porta et al. (2008) do not claim that there is empirical 
evidence in favour of the view that legal origin, as such, is causally linked to 
differences in the level of economic growth across national systems.  They 
provide evidence that legal origin is linked to the availability of external finance 
through capital and credit markets.  Because other studies suggest that legal 
support for external finance promotes growth at the level of the firm (Levine, 
1999), it is tempting to conclude that legal origin is also linked to overall 
economic growth.  However, empirical studies have generally failed to find 
evidence of a direct link between legal origin and the rate of growth of national 
GDP (see La Porta et al., 2008: 301-2).  This suggests that there are aspects of 
the relationship between the legal system and national economic performance 
which have yet to be unravelled. 
 
The two versions of the legal origins hypothesis are to some degree in tension 
with one another. The ‘law matters’ claim implies that a particular, market-
orientated configuration of legal rules can be expected to foster financial 
development (and possibly economic growth more generally) in more or less all 
countries.  The second, the legal origins claim in its more specific sense, implies 
that the approaches of common law and civil law systems to the governance and 
regulation of financial markets are fundamentally distinct.  If this were the case, 
we would not expect ‘one size to fit all’ in the case of law reform; rather, law 
reform should be tailored to local business and institutional conditions.   
 
The legal origins literature tends to the view that the common law model is not 
just different from the civil law alternative, but superior to it: if not ‘always’ 
superior, the common law generally provides more efficient solutions because 
the right regulatory response is often ‘simply less government’ (La Porta et al., 
2008: 309).  However, if the common law truly offered a superior model, we 
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should expect all systems to gravitate to the basic features of that model over 
time, as barriers to convergence are removed as a result of the expansion of 
global trade and the removal of formal restrictions on cross-border capital flows 
(Gugler et al., 2004).  This interpretation is consistent with certain policy 
applications of the legal origins approach, for example those of the World 
Bank’s Doing Business reports (World Bank, various years), which have 
actively promoted convergence of this kind.  An alternative interpretation of 
legal origins theory, however, is that attempts to bring about convergence 
through law reform based on a single model of assumed best practice are 
misplaced, since they amount to the external imposition of a common–law 
model on legal and business systems unsuited to that approach. 
 
The legal origins literature began with a striking empirical finding on the 
relationship between law and finance, to which a theory was later applied.  The 
legal origins field has arguably remained somewhat under-theorised. A 
reassessment of the legal origins approach in terms of first principles may help 
clarify its central hypotheses.  The comparative institutional analysis approach 
(Aoki, 2001, 2010) helpfully models institutions as routines, conventions and 
norms of varying degrees of formality, which serve to coordinate the behaviour 
of agents in environments characterised by uncertainty.  In this approach, 
institutions are seen as evolved, emergent solutions to collective action 
problems.  More formal institutions, such as those of the legal system, contain 
mechanisms for storing and transmitting information about solutions which 
have been shown to work in particular contexts (Deakin and Carvalho, 2011).  
Formality may enable more information to be retained in the system, but at the 
expense of limiting its capacity for variation.  Thus legal institutions may be 
broadly adaptive in the sense of reflecting features of their environments, 
without being optimal.  Complementarities across institutions will tend to lock 
in particular configurations of norms and practices. An implication of lock-in is 
that an institution’s effectiveness depends on the context in which it is placed, 
and on the presence of complementary mechanisms of governance.  Such 
institutions which may not work effectively when transplanted out of context 
(Schmidt and Spindler, 2003).   
 
The idea that legal rules are endogenous to particular economic and political 
contexts is to some degree recognised by legal origin theory.  According to La 
Porta et al. (2008: 288), legal rules in a given country can be expected to have 
‘changed, evolved and adapted to local conditions’ over time.  However, they 
draw a distinction between the content of substantive rules of law, which can be 
adaptive to local contexts in this sense, and what they call ‘legal infrastructure’, 
by which they mean the more deeply embedded rules and practices which 
determine the role of the legal system in shaping social and economic 
behaviour.  In this deep sense, legal origin is not just concerned with individual 
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rules and principles, but also with different ‘styles of social control of economic 
life’; civil law ‘style’ is ‘associated with a heavier hand of government 
ownership and regulation than the common law’ which, by contrast, ‘is 
associated with lower formalism of judicial procedures and greater judicial 
independence than civil law’, and hence with ‘greater contract enforcement and 
greater security of property rights’ (La Porta et al., 2008: 286). While there may 
be feedback between the economic context and particular rules governing (in 
this context) finance and enterprise, the core legal infrastructure is, by contrast, 
relatively unchanging: ‘the legal system provides the fundamental tools for 
addressing social concerns and it is that system, with its codes, distinctive 
institutions, modes of thought and even ideologies, that is very slow to change’ 
(La Porta et al., 2008: 308).   Figure 1 captures this approach. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Legal origin as an exogenous influence on legal rules and the economy  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Armour et al., 2009c. 
 
 
A more thorough-going co-evolutionary approach would argue that even legal 
infrastructure, in the sense referred to by La Porta et al. (2008), is susceptible to 
influence from the economy, and cannot be regarded as an entirely exogenous 
force shaping economic growth.  The supposed pro-market orientation of the 
English common law may be just as much the result of early industrialisation, 
which created the conditions within which influential groups lobbied for rules 
which were broadly protective of property rights and placed constitutional limits 
on the role of government, as its cause (Ahlering and Deakin, 2007).  In the 
British case, financial development preceded the emergence of formal legal 
rules protecting the rights of shareholders by several decades (Cheffins, 2001).   
 
A co-evolutionary perspective need not imply that legal rules are perfectly 
matched to their environment; the evolution of the law is to a certain degree 
determined by the internal conceptual forms and language of legal process 
(Deakin and Carvalho, 2011).  However, the economic and political context can 
be thought of as providing the environment within which certain legal rules are 
selected over others, and hence persist over time.  The relationship between the 
Legal origin 
 
Legal rules Economic 
outcomes 
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legal system on the one hand and the economic and political systems on the 
other is one of dynamic interaction: no single system has priority, with each one 
exerting an indirect, environmental pressure on the evolution of the others (see 
Figure 2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Coevolutionary model of the legal, economic and political systems 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Armour et al., 2009c. 
 
 
In the context of law and finance, the co-evolutionary approach suggests a 
number of linked propositions concerning the functionality, diversity and 
transmissibility of legal norms.  Firstly, rules of corporate law can be thought of 
as reflecting solutions to coordination problems which are to some degree 
general to market-based economic systems, in particular the principal-
agent/shareholder-manager conflict which is inherent in the structure of the 
modern business enterprise (Kraakman et al., 2009).  This view holds that as 
barriers to trade and capital mobility are removed and more or less all systems 
accept the principles of market-based economic development, the rules of 
company and insolvency (or corporate bankruptcy) law will converge (the 
formal convergence hypothesis).  In addition, the effect of this formal 
convergence should be to induce common outcomes in terms of increased 
financial development (the functional convergence hypothesis).  
 
Secondly, however, it could also be the case that solutions to coordination 
problems take different forms in particular countries, reflecting differences in 
the environments within which the relevant legal rules have evolved. Where 
Political 
system 
Legal system 
Economy 
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structures of share ownership, modes of financing and management style differ 
across countries, agency costs will take different forms, which we would expect 
the legal rules of a given system to respond to: thus ‘it may not be accidental 
that codetermination in the corporate governance domain and social democratic 
corporatism in the polity domain coevolved in Germany, while the main bank 
system, the lifetime employment system, and the close alliance between 
industrial associations and relevant administrative bureaux coevolved in Japan, 
both in contrast to the so-called Anglo-American model’ (Aoki, 2001: 17).  This 
perspective gives rise to what may be called the complementarity hypothesis.   
 
Thirdly, and relatedly, the presence of complementarities across institutions in a 
given national context limits the scope for the successful transplantation of 
particular institutions into other contexts, no matter how well they may have 
worked in their systems of origin (Pistor et al., 2003). We may call this the 
transplant hypothesis. 
 
These hypotheses raise issues which can only be resolved through empirical 
inquiry.  The critical variables are those relating to the nature and pace of legal 
change across systems and the extent of continuing diversity in market 
structures and patterns of business organization.  While there is abundant 
evidence concerning the second of these, data on the first have until recently 
been either unobtainable or unreliable.  This brings us to the second problem 
with the existing legal origins literature, namely the partial nature of the 
available data on legal systems. 
 
3. Leximetric Analysis: Revealing the Pattern of Legal Change 
 
3.1 Identifying core shareholder and creditor rights 
 
The anti-director right index (‘ADRI’) constructed by La Porta et al. (1998), in 
common with most of their other indices, provides a view of the state of law as 
it existed in the mid-1990s.  Since that time, there has been considerable legal 
change in the area of shareholder and creditor rights.  Together with colleagues 
at the Centre for Business Research (‘CBR’) at Cambridge, we have constructed 
datasets designed to capture the direction and extent of that change.  These 
datasets, among other things, provide a measure of legal protection for 
shareholders and creditors in a sample of 25 countries over the period 1995 to 
2005.  The sample includes a range of developed, developing and transition 
systems.1   
 
Legal indices are bound to be selective. The issue is how broadly representative 
of the content of legal rules they are and whether bias can be avoided in their 
construction.  The ADRI developed by La Porta et al. (1998) consisted of six 
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indicators that were intended to capture the extent of shareholder control over 
the board of directors and the management of the firm more generally.  These 
indicators related to the following matters: how far the law required companies 
to allow shareholders to vote by proxy; to what extent the law prevented the 
blocking by the board of shareholders’ voting and related rights prior to a 
general meeting; whether companies were required to observe a  ‘cumulative 
voting’ rule allowing for proportional representation of shareholders on the 
board; the degree to which the law provided for shareholders to have pre-
emption rights in respect of new share issues, thereby preventing the dilution of 
stakes; and the proportion of votes required to call a shareholders’ meeting.  The 
composition of this index has been much criticised for, among other things, an 
apparent ‘home-country bias’, that is, a tendency to treat US law as the norm 
and, as a result, to accord unduly low scores to civil law systems which 
employed different legal tools to reach the same end of protecting shareholder 
rights (see Cools, 2005; Braendle, 2006; Spamann, 2010).  There are other gaps 
in the index; it says nothing, for example, about board composition, or about the 
rules governing takeover bids.  These are significant omissions since the issues 
of board structure and takeover regulation are at the core of the international 
corporate governance standards, in particular the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance which were first issued in 1999 (see now OECD, 2004), 
which have been used by many countries to benchmark their corporate laws and 
regulations since the mid-1990s. 
 
The CBR’s longitudinal shareholder protection index (‘SPI’), on which we base 
our analysis, contains ten variables which are intended to capture a range of 
legal rules relating to shareholder protection in a way which avoids ‘home-
country bias’ while also including the more important elements of the law 
reform process of the past decade or so.  The ten indicators include a variable 
for board independence and one for the mandatory bid rule in takeover law, a 
mechanism designed to protect minority shareholder rights during bids.  Other 
variables cover issues relating to the powers of the general meeting, dismissal of 
directors, and legal support for private enforcement of rights by shareholders 
against directors (see Siems et al., 2009; Siems, 2008; Armour et al., 2009b, 
2009c). 
 
La Porta’s et al.’s 1998 ‘law and finance’ paper also coded for creditor rights. 
Their creditor rights index (‘CRI’) contained four indicators which addressed 
how far the law imposed restrictions on a company entering reorganisation, 
whether it provided for an automatic stay on claims on secured assets in 
insolvency, to what extent it gave priority to secured creditors rights, and 
whether it allowed management to initiate a stay on claims through, for 
example, a ‘debtor in possession rule’.  The CBR’s creditor protection index 
(‘CPI’) contains ten indicators (Armour et al., 2009d).  The range of legal data 
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coded here is significantly wider than that contained in La Porta et al.’s CRI.  
The first three indicators are concerned with rules on minimum capital, dividend 
distribution and directors’ duties which, in broad terms, determine the balance 
of power between creditors and shareholders while the company is a going 
concern.  The next three relate to the protection of the rights of secured 
creditors, and cover the scope for creation of non-possessory security interests, 
the priority of creditor’s rights, and the extent to which the law allows secured 
creditors to enforce their rights without a court order.  The final four indicators 
code the core parts of insolvency law (that is, the law of corporate as opposed to 
personal bankruptcy), and cover the extent of creditors’ powers to initiate 
insolvency proceedings, rules on the stay of secured creditors, how far the law 
grants creditors (as opposed to a court or the company itself) the right to close 
the firm down, and how far the law determines the rank order of secured 
creditors in the event of bankruptcy. 
 
3.2 Methodological considerations in coding legal change over time 
 
The datasets we are analysing differ from those of La Porta et al. (1998) not 
simply in providing a longitudinal measure of legal change, but in the approach 
they take to the coding of legal rules. We make three major changes from their 
approach. First, the choice of variables in our datasets reflects the theory of 
‘functional equivalents’ in comparative law (Zweigert and Kötz, 1992).  This 
holds that a rule which takes a certain legal form in one system may be 
expressed in other legal systems in a different way. To respond to this, we 
employ coding protocols which describe the variables of interest in broad, 
functional terms, rather than using as a benchmark the laws in force in a 
particular important jurisdiction (e.g. the US). We also code for rules which, 
while not part of the positive law, are found in codes and other self-regulatory 
instruments that could nevertheless be regarded as the functional equivalent of 
laws in many jurisdictions. This enables us to code several variables of key 
concern, such as rules contained in corporate governance and takeover codes, 
which La Porta et al. (1998) omitted from their analyses, apparently on the 
grounds that they did not take the form of positive legal rules in the US system.  
Secondly, we use graduated variables, in order to capture more of the detail of 
legal variation.  La Porta et al. had largely relied on binary variables, in 
particular in their early studies (see e.g. La Porta et al., 1998).  Thirdly, we code 
not just for mandatory rules of law as La Porta et al. mostly did, but also for 
default rules and other norms which could be modified by the parties directly 
affected by them, adjusting the scores given in each case to allow for the ease 
with which the rules could be modified.    
 
 
 
10 
 
3.3. Changes in the law governing shareholder and creditor rights 1995-2005 
 
Figures 3-6 set out in graphical form the main trends in the SPI and CPI, broken 
down firstly by reference to countries grouped by their level of economic 
development and legal origin.  In the case of shareholder protection, there was a 
steady rise in the score for all countries over the whole period.  The two 
variables which account for most of the rise in the country scores are those 
relating to independent boards and the mandatory bid rule in takeover bids, both 
core aspects of the common law approach to corporate governance law (for 
further details of these changes see Armour et al., 2009c). Transition systems 
saw a rapid jump in protection after 1995 in developing countries there was 
marked increase after 2000.  Developed countries continued to have a higher 
level of protection throughout, but the gap between them and the rest had 
narrowed by the end of the period (Figure 3).  When the same data are analysed 
by reference to legal origin, a closing of the gap between common law and civil 
law systems can also be seen (Figure 4).  Thus the picture presented in La Porta 
et al. (1998), of strong protection for shareholder rights in the common law 
world, while true at the start of the period under review here which is also the 
point in time to which their study refers, was not true at the end of it, a finding 
which emphasises the importance of having longitudinal data.   
 
 
The charts tracking change in the CPI also show an increase in protection over 
time.  Common law systems and developed systems again have the highest 
scores, but the gap between the common law and civil law has almost 
disappeared by the end of the period (Figures 5 and 6).  Further analysis show 
that French origin systems (a group which includes the southern European and 
Latin American systems) had lower scores than both English-origin and 
German-origin ones, but that this family of systems also experienced some of 
the largest increases in protection over time.  This suggests that French-origin 
systems were converging on the more protective approaches of the other two 
legal families.  By type of legal rule, the most significant changes across all 
systems involved greater protection for the rights of secured creditors, including 
legal measures to facilitate out-of-court enforcement of security interests (see 
Armour et al., 2009c for these further details).   
 
Both datasets therefore provide strong evidence for formal convergence.  The 
indices on which the data are based measure changes in the formal law, that is, 
the law contained in written legal texts and judicial decisions, as well as in those 
of certain ‘soft law’ measures such as corporate governance and takeover codes 
which are functional equivalents of state-based law in some systems.  Thus we 
cannot interpret these findings, in isolation, as support for the claim that systems 
are converging at the functional level of the operation of legal rules.  To do that 
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we have to go to a further stage, that of econometric analysis aimed at 
identifying the nature of the relationship between legal change and economic 
change. 
 
Figure 3. Shareholder protection 1995-2005: developed, developing and transition 
systems 
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Source: CBR Shareholder Protection Index, 25 countries, 1995-2005 
(http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm) 
 
 
Figure 4.  Shareholder protection 1995-2005: common law and civil law countries 
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Source: see Figure 3. 
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Figure 5. Creditor protection 1995-2005: developed, developing and transition systems 
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Source: see Figure 3. 
 
Figure 6. Creditor protection 1995-2005: common law and civil law countries 
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Source: see Figure 3. 
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4. The Relationship between Legal Change and Financial Development: 
Econometric Analysis 
 
With longitudinal data available, it becomes possible to estimate the economic 
impact of legal change in new ways.  The critical questions are: did the 
increases in shareholder protection law that we have observed in the legal 
datasets enhance stock market development; and did stronger creditor protection 
induce an expansion of private credit?  
 
One way to address this question is to carry out country by country studies of 
the impact of the law, using time series analyses for those cases where very long 
runs of data are available.  We have used these techniques in earlier work, using 
separate indices to those described above, which cover a longer period, 1970-
2005, but for a smaller range of countries.  Fagernäs et al. (2008), Sarkar (2009)  
and Sarkar and Singh (2010) find no positive impact of increases in shareholder 
protection, and some negative effects, on financial development in France, 
Germany, India, the US and UK.  Deakin et al. (2010) find a positive impact of 
changes in creditor protection on bank credit in India.  We have also carried out, 
for selected countries in our sample, case-study work using documentary and 
interview-based materials, to complement our econometric analyses (Armour 
and Lele, 2010; Buchanan and Deakin, 2008; Cankar et al., 2010).  Taken 
together, these individual country studies suggest that legal origin interacts with 
country-specific institutions in a variety of ways, but these results are hard to 
generalise from.  A panel data analysis using a larger sample of countries may 
throw light on more generic properties of legal reform initiatives. 
 
In the panel data analysis we report here for the first time, we consider two 
relationships: one is between the scores in the SPI and a number of measures of 
stock market development at national level, and the other is between the scores 
in the CPI and banking and credit market development, again at national level. 
As indicators of stock market development we employ the following four 
variables (used one at a time): (1) market capitalisation, or the value of listed 
shares to GDP (marketcap): (2) the value of total shares traded on the stock 
market exchange to GDP (sharestraded); (3) the turnover ratio, which is the 
value of total shares traded over average real market capitalization 
(turnoverratio); and (4) the number of listed firms per million of population 
(listed), each in natural log.  As indicators of banking and credit market 
development, we use the following two variables: (1) domestic credit provided 
by the banking sector as a percentage of GDP (bankcredit), and (2) domestic 
credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP (privcredit), again in natural 
log.2   
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In our causality tests, we incorporate the level of economic activity in a country, 
which is represented by real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity constant 
dollars (in natural log: gdppercap).  We also include in the regression data 
drawn from the Rule of Law Index (rule)3 available from the WGI (Worldwide 
Governance Indicators) project of the World Bank.  Since our period of analysis 
is marked by the end of the dotcom bubble, we also use a dummy variable, dot, 
which takes the value zero for 1995-2000, and 1 for the period, 2001-2005.  
 
To ascertain whether the direction of causality is from shareholder or creditor 
protection (Z) to financial market development (X) or the opposite or both 
(reverse or cumulative causation), we use panel VAR (Vector-Autoregressive) 
Granger causality tests over the period, 1995-2005. To ascertain whether Z 
(shareholder or creditor protection taken one at a time) causes X (alternative 
finance market variables taken one at a time), the panel VAR Granger causality 
test suggests fitting the following regression: 
 
               p               q                r 
(1)   Xit = j Xi, t-j +  k Y i, t-k + j Zi, t-l +    + .ruleit + dott + it                
               j =1          k = 1           l=1 
 
where Y is GDP per capita (in natural log), rule is the rule of law index, dot is a 
dummy for dotcom bubble which takes the value zero for 1995-2000 and 1 for 
the period 2001-2005,  is the fixed effect common across the panels, and it is 
the error term varying across time and panels (for further details, see Table 1). 
 
Our panel VAR causality tests first of all look at the overall sample of countries.  
We find no evidence of a causal relationship running from the SPI to stock 
market development (see Table 1a). Nor is there a causal relationship from the 
CPI to banking and credit market development.  In short, looking at the sample 
of countries as a whole, legal change has not had an impact on financial 
development. There is also little or no evidence of reverse causation, that is to 
say, of changes in law caused by financial development.  
 
However, a more nuanced picture emerges when we break the sample down by 
reference to countries’ states of development and legal origin.  When we 
compare developed, developing and transition countries (Table 1b-d), we can 
see that legal reform in the area of shareholder rights has had a discernible 
impact on financial growth in the developing country group.  In their case, there 
is a causal relationship running from changes in the SPI to changes in stock 
market capitalisation as a proportion of GDP.  We also see evidence of reverse 
causation in developing countries, with a causal relationship running from the 
stock trading indicator to the SPI.  In the case of transition systems we find 
evidence of an impact of legal change in the case of creditor protection, with 
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changes in the CPI linked to domestic credit provided through the banking 
system.  With the transition systems we also see evidence of growth in stock 
markets feeding into changes in the law, with causation running from the stock 
market listing indicator to the SPI.  However, there is no discernible impact of 
the SPI on stock market development in transition systems.  
 
Next we examine the impact on countries by reference to their legal origin.  For 
the common law countries in our sample, changes in the SPI are positively 
linked to changes in three of the stock-market development indices, namely 
those relating to stock market capitalisation, the value of stock trading, and 
stock market turnover (Table 1e).  No such relationship can be found in the case 
of the civil law systems (Table 1f).4 
 
 
Table 1.  Relationship between Shareholder and Creditor Protection and Financial 
Development, 1995-2005: Panel VAR Granger Causality Tests 
 
Table 1a. All 25 countries 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
financial 
indicator 
Excluded 
variable: 
legal index 
Chi-square Dependent 
variable: 
legal index 
Excluded 
variable: 
financial 
indicator 
 
Chi-square 
marketcap 
lag =2 
SPI 2.3875 SPI marketcap 
 
3.5296 
sharestraded 
lag = 2 
SPI 1.9323 SPI sharestraded 
 
1.2111 
turnoverratio 
lag = 3 
SPI 3.6520 SPI turnoverratio 
 
1.1293 
listed 
lag = 2 
SPI 2.2775 SPI listed 
 
1.5507 
bankcredit 
lag = 2 
CPI 0.5377 CPI bankcredit 
 
0.1852 
privcredit 
lag = 3 
CPI 4.3508 CPI privcredit 
 
1.2799 
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Table 1b. Developed countries 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
financial 
indicator 
Excluded 
variable: 
legal index 
Chi-square Dependent 
variable: 
legal index 
Excluded 
variable: 
financial 
indicator 
 
Chi-square 
marketcap 
lag =4 
SPI 6.6875 SPI marketcap 
 
3.3164 
sharestraded 
lag = 5 
SPI 5.1465 SPI sharestraded 
 
0.8701 
turnoverratio 
lag = 2 
SPI 4.0408 SPI turnoverratio 
 
1.2568 
listed 
lag = 3 
SPI 0.5766 SPI listed 
 
4.0517 
bankcredit 
lag = 2 
CPI 0.2445 CPI bankcredit 
 
1.3692 
privcredit 
lag = 5 
CPI 2.1139 CP1 privcredit 
 
2.7815 
 
 
Table 1c. Developing countries 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
financial 
indicator 
Excluded 
variable: 
legal index 
Chi-square Dependent 
variable: 
legal index 
Excluded 
variable: 
financial 
indicator 
 
Chi-square 
marketcap 
lag =3 
SPI 8.9586* SPI marketcap 
 
4.8162 
sharestraded 
lag = 5 
SPI 4.5469 SPI sharestraded 
 
14.2443* 
turnoverratio 
lag = 2 
SPI 1.4009 SPI turnoverratio 
 
0.9437 
listed 
lag = 2 
SPI 0.7572 SPI listed 
 
0.8878 
bankcredit 
lag = 5 
CPI 6.8047 CPI bankcredit 
 
1.9443 
privcredit 
lag = 5 
CPI 8.6555 CPI privcredit 
 
26.8424* 
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Table 1d. Transition countries 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
financial 
indicator 
Excluded 
variable: 
legal index 
Chi-square Dependent 
variable: 
legal index 
Excluded 
variable: 
financial 
indicator 
 
Chi-square 
marketcap 
lag = 4 
SPI 2.0098 SPI marketcap 
 
6.0362 
sharestraded 
lag = 5 
SPI 6.4195 SPI sharestraded 
 
4.9790 
turnoverratio 
lag = 4 
SPI 6.5939 SPI turnoverratio 
 
7.1069 
listed 
lag = 5 
SPI 4.1690 SPI listed 
 
24.2963* 
bankcredit 
lag = 5 
CPI 11.3119* CPI bankcredit 
 
5.9692 
privcredit 
lag = 4 
CPI 5.0256 CP1 privcredit 
 
2.9792 
 
 
Table 1e. Common law countries 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
financial 
indicator 
Excluded 
variable: 
legal index 
Chi-square Dependent 
variable: 
legal index 
Excluded 
variable: 
financial 
indicator 
 
Chi-square 
marketcap 
lag = 5 
SPI 16.6203* SPI marketcap 
 
0.8783 
sharestraded 
lag = 5 
SPI 16.2740* SPI sharestraded 
 
5.6352 
turnoverratio 
lag = 2 
SPI 8.7912* SPI turnoverratio 
 
1.2399 
listed 
lag = 2 
SPI 0.1205 SPI listed 
 
0.9630 
bankcredit 
lag = 2 
CPI 4.4378 CPI bankcredit 
 
11.7242* 
privcredit 
lag = 4 
CPI 3.2676 CP1 privcredit 
 
9.0261 
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Table 1f. Civil law countries 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
financial 
indicator 
Excluded 
variable: 
legal index 
Chi-square Dependent 
variable: 
legal index 
Excluded 
variable: 
financial 
indicator 
Chi-square 
marketcap 
lag = 5 
SPI 8.8863 SPI marketcap 
 
6.3117 
sharestraded 
lag = 5 
SPI 6.9918 SPI sharestraded 
 
6.7643 
turnoverratio 
lag = 5 
SPI 8.2126 SPI turnoverratio 
 
4.6309 
listed 
lag = 2 
SPI 1.0952 SPI listed 
 
1.4964 
bankcredit 
lag = 2 
CPI 0.1997 CPI bankcredit 
 
0.5737 
privcredit 
lag = 3 
CPI 5.0221 CP1 privcredit 
 
0.4562 
 
Notes: 
 
* Null hypothesis of no causality is rejected at 5 % level. 
 
To ascertain whether Z (shareholder or creditor protection taken one at a time) causes X 
(alternative finance market variables taken one at a time), the panel VAR Granger causality 
test suggests fitting the following regression: 
 
               p               q                r 
(1)   Xit = j Xi, t-j +  k Y i, t-k + j Zi, t-l +    + .ruleit + dott + it                
               j =1          k = 1           l=1 
 
where  Y is GDP per capita (in natural log), rule is the rule of law index, dot is a dummy for 
dotcom bubble which takes the value zero for 1995-2000 and 1 for the period, 2001-2005, 
is the fixed effect common across the panels and it is the error term varying across time 
and panels.  To choose the lags (p, q and r in the regression model) which indicate how many 
past years are to be considered, a number of possible approaches are available (such as the 
sequential modified LR test statistic (LRM), the final prediction error approach (FPE), the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Schwarz information criterion (SC), and the Hannan-
Quinn information criterion (HQ)).  Different criteria often choose different lag lengths and 
we have used the maximum lag length in each case.  Similarly, to test whether X causes Z we 
interchange the position of X and Z in the above equation.   
 
The following abbreviations are used: 
 
SPI is aggregate shareholder protection; 
CPI is aggregate creditor protection; 
bankcredit is domestic credit provided by the banking sector as a percentage  of GDP (in 
natural log); 
privcredit is domestic credit to private sector as percentage of GDP (in natural log); 
marketcap is the value of listed shares to GDP (in natural log);  
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sharestraded is the value of total shares traded on the stock market exchange to GDP (in 
natural log); 
turnoverratio is the ratio of the value of total shares traded to average real market 
capitalization (in natural log); 
listed is the number of listed firms per million of population (in natural log). 
 
In Table 1b the eleven developed (OECD member) countries are Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. 
 
In Table 1c the nine developing countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, and Turkey. 
 
In Table 1d the five transition countries are China, Czech Republic, Latvia, Russia, and 
Slovenia. 
 
In Table 1e the seven common law origin countries are Canada, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
South Africa, UK and US. 
 
In Table 1f the thirteen civil law countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. 
 
Sources:  
 
Data on shareholder and creditor protection are derived from the CBR Shareholder Protection 
Index (25 countries) and Creditor Protection Index (25 countries) respectively 
(http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20output.htm). 
 
Financial development indicators: World Bank Financial Structure Dataset. 
 
Rule of law: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
 
 
The Granger causality tests we have just described can help to tell us whether 
one variable influences another, but they do not tell us whether the impact is 
positive or negative.  The next step is to ascertain whether the nature of the 
influence is favourable or unfavourable for those relationships where we 
observe statistically significant causal links.  We do this by using the two-step 
GMM (generalised method of moment) technique.  This involves using lags of 
the independent variables as instruments to tackle the problem of false 
correlation between the included (independent) variables and the error term 
which arises from the possible exclusion of time-variant factors in the 
regression.  We use robust standard errors which are appropriate for dealing 
with the possibility of arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (using 
automatic band-width selection according to the Newey-West test). 
The estimates that are reported in Table 2 show a significant positive impact of 
shareholder protection on stock market capitalisation as a proportion of GDP in 
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developing countries and in countries with a common law legal origin. (Table 
2a)  By contrast, in common law countries, the impact of shareholder protection 
on the turnover ratio is negative (Table 2c).  For developing countries, we find a 
positive impact of the value of stock market trading on shareholder protection 
(Table 2f).  No statistically significant relationship between creditor protection 
laws and either bank or private credit is indicated (Tables 2d, 2g and 2h), and 
the sign in the correlation between creditor protection and bank credit in 
transition systems is negative. This suggests that we cannot interpret our 
Granger causality findings as evidence for a beneficial impact of creditor rights 
in transition countries.   
 
Table 2. Relationship between Shareholder and Creditor Protection and Financial 
Development Indicators: Panel-data Estimation using the GMM Technique 
 
Table 2a. Dependent variable: stock market capitalization as a proportion of GDP 
(marketcap) 
 
Independent variable Common law 
countries 
Developing  
countries 
 
SPI 0.333*** 
(0.107) 
0.301*** 
(0.075) 
GDP per capita 
(gdppercap) 
0.222*** 
(0.123) 
0.348** 
(0.139) 
dotcom dummy (dot) -0.171 
(-0.198) 
0.019 
(0.184) 
intercept (a) 0.558 
(0.814) 
-0.699 
(1.281) 
R2 0.659 0.329 
 
 
Table 2b. Dependent variable: value of stock trading (sharestraded) 
 
Independent variable Common law 
countries 
 
SPI 0.057 
(0.108) 
GDP per capita 
(gdppercap) 
0.284* 
(0.123) 
dotcom dummy (dot) 0.169 
(0.190) 
intercept (a) 1.145 
(0.959) 
R2 0.368 
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Table 2c Dependent variable: turnover ratio (turnoverratio) 
 
Independent variable Common law 
countries 
 
SPI -0.359** 
(0.144) 
GDP per capita 
(gdppercap) 
0.246 
(0.229) 
dotcom dummy (dot) 0.585** 
(0.236) 
intercept (a) 3.385 
(1.446) 
R2 0.227 
 
 
 
Table 2d. Dependent variable: bank credit as a proportion of GDP (bankcredit) 
 
Independent variable Transition countries 
 
CPI -0.178 
(0.613) 
GDP per capita 
(gdppercap) 
-0.381*** 
(0.153) 
intercept (a) 7.414*** 
(1.479) 
R2 0.189 
 
 
 
Table 2e. Dependent variable: shareholder protection (SPI) 
 
Independent variable Transition countries 
 
listed firms per 
million of population 
(list) 
0.535 
(0.427) 
GDP per capita 
(gdppercap) 
-2.721** 
(1.079) 
intercept (a) 26.779* 
(8.979) 
R2 0.409 
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Table 2f. Dependent variable: shareholder protection (SPI) 
 
Independent variable Developing countries 
 
Value of stock 
trading 
(sharestraded) 
0.831*** 
(0.326) 
GDP per capita 
(gdppercap) 
-0.192 
(1.079) 
intercept (a) 3.083 
(5.889) 
R2 0.160 
 
 
Table 2g. Dependent variable: creditor protection (CPI) 
 
Independent variable Developing countries 
 
private credit as a 
percentage of GDP 
(privcredit) 
0.022 
(0.031) 
GDP per capita 
(gdppercap) 
0.115 
(0.031) 
intercept (a) 0.349 
(0.245) 
R2 0.00 
 
 
Table 2h. Dependent variable: creditor protection (CPI) 
 
Independent variable Common law 
countries 
 
Bank credit as a 
percentage of GDP 
(bankcredit) 
-0.038 
(0.051) 
GDP per capita 
(gdppercap) 
0.069*** 
(0.021) 
intercept (a) 0.15 
(0.089) 
R2 0.603 
 
Notes: 
 
*  significant at the 10% level 
**  significant at the 5% level 
***  significant at the 10% level 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Our estimates are efficient for arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (using automatic band-width selection according to 
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Newey-West).  The Hansen-J statistic supports the proposition that all the equations are 
exactly specified. 
 
Sources:  
 
See Table 1. 
 
5. Interpretation 
In interpreting these findings, we first of all consider evidence on the causal 
relationship between legal change and financial development.  We have seen 
that for the sample as a whole, no clear relationship emerges. This is evidence 
against the hypothesis of functional convergence.  There is evidence of formal 
convergence of legal rules in more or less all systems, but no relationship 
between these legal reforms and the expected economic outcome variables, 
when the whole sample is considered. 
 
However, when we look at groups of countries by reference to state of 
development and legal origin, a number of relationships begin to emerge.  The 
first such finding is that increased shareholder protection leads to stock market 
development in the common law but not the civil law.  The formal changes 
recorded in the SPI essentially map the worldwide diffusion of a legal model 
emphasising independent boards, protection for shareholders during takeover 
bids, and shareholder control over key corporate decision-making processes.  
This model originated in the common law systems of the UK and USA and 
spread out from there.  Thus its positive impact on the group of common law 
countries as a whole is evidence in favour of the complementarity hypothesis.  
Laws originating in the two most influential common law systems appear to 
have worked to have had an impact in other systems which shared similar 
features in terms of relatively more dispersed share ownership structures and 
liquid capital markets.  The absence of this impact on the outcome variables in 
the case of the civil law world is evidence for the converse proposition, namely 
the transplant hypothesis: common law institutions did not work well when 
adopted in the context of the civil law world’s concentrated share ownership 
and relatively illiquid capital markets. 
 
Our second finding is that shareholder rights matter more for financial growth in 
the developing world than in the developed one.  At first sight this may be a 
surprising finding.  However, it needs to be seen in the context of evidence that 
firms are more, not less, reliant on stock market funding as a source of external 
finance in the developing world than in the developed one (Singh, 1993, 1995; 
Glen and Singh, 2003; Gugler et al., 2004).  Listed companies in developed 
countries make comparatively little use of the stock market to fund growth, 
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preferring to rely on retained earnings.  In the developed country context, the 
stock market acts principally as a mechanism of evaluation of corporate 
performance, rather than as a source of finance for firms.  It is in developing 
countries that stock markets more clearly perform the function of directly 
supporting the growth of firms.  Our finding suggests that legal reforms can 
usefully support this developmental role of stock markets. 
 
The mix of positive and negative results we derived from our GMM analysis is 
consistent with this analysis.  For common law systems, it would appear that the 
increase in shareholder protection led to a growth in the value of shares in listed 
companies as a proportion of GDP, but not to a corresponding increase in the 
value of shares traded.  This is why the impact of increasing shareholder rights 
was negative in the case of the turnover ratio, which measures the value of 
shares traded over average real market capitalisation.  For developing countries, 
we see an increase in share values, but no fall in the turnover ratio.  We also 
find that, in developing countries, an increase in the value of shares traded led to 
greater shareholder protection, suggesting a market-based demand for legal 
reform in those countries.   
 
Thus for the common law world, the increase in shareholder rights contributed 
to a rise of share values which was not matched by a rise in the volume of 
trading.  This is a hint, in our data, of the problem of ‘irrational exuberance’ in 
stock markets, and the resulting ‘over-valuation’ of equity (Jensen, 2005), 
during this period.  Our results suggest that this was a phenomenon associated 
with stock markets in developed, common law countries.  For the developing 
world, by contrast, we see an increase in the volume of stock market activity, as 
measured by the values of shares traded, triggering demand for greater 
shareholder rights. Shareholder protection, in turn, helped to stimulate a growth 
in share values without a fall in the turnover ratio, implying that the level of 
stock market activity was more or less keeping up.  Thus in the developing 
world, where growth in share values which was matched by trading volumes, 
legal reforms were associated with financial development of a more sustainable 
type. 
 
We now turn to our evidence on the question of reverse causality.  We 
identified some influence of financial development on the law in developing 
countries, where growth in stock market trading was linked to an increase in 
shareholder rights. This is evidence of demand for legal reform in developing 
systems, of the kind that implies cumulative causation: legal reform is capable 
of stimulating financial growth which, in turn, intensifies the process of legal 
change. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
As a result of the above findings reported above, a clearer view is being 
obtained of the relationship between legal change, financial development and 
economic growth.  Shareholder-orientated corporate laws promote stock market 
growth in the common law world where complementary institutions, in the form 
of dispersed share ownership and liquid capital markets, are present.  They have 
a greater impact, in terms of promoting financial growth, in the developing 
world than in developed countries.  We also find evidence of reverse causation, 
with stock market growth triggering demand for shareholder rights, in the 
developing world.  Our results on creditor protection are more ambivalent: we 
have weak evidence of a negative causal impact of creditor rights on bank credit 
in transition systems. 
 
The absence of an overall correlation between law reform and financial market 
development indicates that the strengthening of shareholder rights and creditor 
rights has not had its intended effect on countries across the board.  The positive 
impact of increased shareholder protection in common law systems, when 
compared to its non-impact in the civil law world, suggests the presence of 
complementarities between legal and financial institutions.  The evidence that 
shareholder protection rights have stimulated financial growth in developing 
countries highlights the demand for external finance supplied through equity 
markets in those systems.   
 
Outside these cases, however, national conditions appear to be setting limits to 
the effectiveness of legal transplants.  Formal convergence of laws continues 
alongside persistent, underlying diversities.  More generally, it would seem that 
laws work best when they are embedded in particular configurations of 
institutions at national level as opposed to being transplanted from outside.  
Thus our empirical results support the suggestion that legal rules are, to a 
significant degree, endogenous to the economic and political context of the 
systems in which they operate.  Our findings question the validity of a one-size-
fits all approach to law reform, and highlight the need for a more context-
specific analysis of the contribution to institutions to financial development of 
the kind which, as others have noted (Rodrik, 2006), may be appropriate for an 
emerging, post-Washington consensus world. 
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Notes 
1 The countries coded are: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech 
Republic, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, UK, US.  In addition to these datasets, described in the 
text, the CBR project has also produced longer time series, covering the period 
1970-2005, for five countries: France, Germany, India, the UK and the US.  All 
the CBR datasets referred to in this paper can be consulted and downloaded on 
line.  See: http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-
20output.htm. 
2 These are the standard measures used in analyses of stock market development 
and private credit at national level and are based on World Bank data.  See the 
notes to Table 1 for further details. 
3 This index is available for all the countries covered in the study for almost all 
the years, 1995-2005. For some years, no data are provided; in that case we 
used data for the following year. For example, where 1995 data are not 
available, we use 1996 data for both 1995 and 1996.   
4 This analysis excludes the five transition systems which in principle have civil 
law origins on the grounds that, in the context of their development in the 
period under review, this feature was comparatively unimportant when set 
alongside their transition status.  
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